Does disturbance of self underlie social cognition deficits in schizophrenia and other psychotic disorders?
Although the different approaches to psychosis research have made significant advances in their own fields, integration between the approaches is often lacking. This paper attempts to integrate a strand of cognitive research in psychotic disorders (specifically, social cognition research) with phenomenological accounts of schizophrenia and other psychotic disorders. The paper is a critical investigation of phenomenological models of disturbed selfhood in schizophrenia in relation to cognitive theories of social cognition in psychotic disorders. We argue that disturbance of the basic sense of self, as articulated in the phenomenological literature, may underlie the social cognition difficulties present in psychotic disorders. This argument is based on phenomenological thinking about self-presence ('ipseity') being the primary or most basic ground for the intentionality of consciousness - that is, the directedness of consciousness towards others and the world. A disruption in this basic ground of conscious life has a reverberating effect through other areas of cognitive and social functioning. We propose three routes whereby self-disturbance may compromise social cognition, including dissimilarity, disruption of lived body and disturbed mental coherence. If this model is supported, then social cognition difficulties may be thought of as a secondary index or marker of the more primary disturbance of self in psychotic disorders. Further empirical work examining the relationship between cognitive and phenomenological variables may be of value in identifying risk markers for psychosis onset, thus contributing to early intervention efforts, as well as in clarifying the essential psychopathological features of schizophrenia and other psychotic disorders.